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TAXATION OF GIFTS OF STOCK IN A LIQUIDATING CORPORATION
Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973)
Taxpayer-petitioner and his wife were majority stockholders' of a
closely held corporation. In April, all shareholders approved a plan
of liquidation pursuant to section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.2 A few days later the directors began distributing to stock-
holders a portion of the corporate assets. In June, taxpayer transferred
to DePauw University, without restriction, a 56.8% stock interest in
the corporation.3 The liquidation plan proceeded4 and in September,
after the sale of all real property, the direotors adopted a resolution
to dissolve.5 Taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction and excluded
from gross income the capital gain that resulted from the payment of
liquidating dividends6 to DePauw. The Commissioner determined that
1. Kinsey and his wife held 81.3% of the stock. John P. Kinsey, 58 T.C. 259,
260 (1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Gain or loss upon sale or exchange of corporate property during a twelve-
month liquidating period is not recognized to the corporation provided the corporation
adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distributes all its assets, except those retained
to pay claims, within twelve months of the adoption of the plan. The twelve-month
period commences with the adoption of the plan. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a).
See note 6 infra.
3. Neither DePauw nor its representative, Kinsey's personal friend, was advised
of the liquidation plan, and neither learned of the liquidation until the first liquidating
dividends were received. Although DePauw's policy was to sell all gifts of stock upon
receipt, it did not do so on Kinsey's advice. 58 T.C. at 262.
4. No effort was made by stockholders to produce the two-thirds majority required
by Connecticut law, CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-329(d) (1972), to reverse or aban-
don the plan. 58 T.C. at 266.
5. 58 T.C. at 263. Final distribution was made in December. Id.
6. When a corporation liquidates its assets, it generally redeems its stock for cash
or property; this distribution is known as a liquidating dividend. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 331(a)(1), states the general rule for determining the tax effect of liquidating
dividends on the stockholder: Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corpo-
ration shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock. Gain to the tax-
payer is thus treated as capital gain from sale of property, rather than a taxable divi-
dend, even though the distribution contains earnings and profit. See 3 P-H 1973 FD.
TAxEs 17,576; B. B1rTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDmuR INCOME TAXATION OF CORPOaRTONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 11.01 (1971).
Corporate assets can be liquidated either by a distribution in kind for sale by share-
holders or through sale of assets by the corporation itself, followed by a distribution
of proceeds. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 336, provides that the corporation recognizes
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the capital gain should be taxed to ,the taxpayer instead of DePauw.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming a Tax Court judg-
ment, 7 held: The stock transfer was an anticipatory assignment of
liquidation proceeds; therefore, the capital gain derived from the pro-
ceeds was taxable to petitioner.8
Assignments of income and property often are used in an attempt
to cushion the impact of the federal income tax progressive rates on
high income taxpayers.9 Both the Commissioner and the courts,10
no gain or loss on distribution of assets (not including installment obligations) in com-
plete or partial liquidation. The corporation must, however, continue to pay corporate
tax on sales until actual dissolution. Id. Prior to enactment of INT. RaV. CODE OF
1954, § 337, liquidation in kind followed by shareholder sale resulted in a lower total
tax on assets than corporate sale and proceeds distribution because corporate tax on
the sale was avoided. Uncertainties occurred, however, in determining which category
of sale a transaction fit. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451
(1950); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Section 337 was
enacted to avoid this uncertainty by eliminating the corporate tax whether the sale is
made by the corporation in anticipation of liquidation or by shareholders thereafter.
See B. BrrraER & J. EusIc, supra 1 11.60-.64; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX. L. REV. 295, 420 (1962).
Since distribution in kind to a shareholder's assignee would be inconvenient § 337
facilitates assignments of liquidating dividends by permitting nontaxable corporate sale
of assets and subsequent distribution of proceeds to the assignee. On complete liquida-
tion, then, 9H 331 and 337 operate so that earnings and profits completely escape taxa-
tion as ordinary income, no corporate tax liability arises from sale of assets, and liqui-
dating dividends are taxed to the shareholder as capital gain. Were the assignment to
DePauw, an educational institution, valid, all gain would have escaped taxation. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501.
7. John P. Kinsey, 58 T.C. 259 (1972).
8. Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). In Dickey v. Commissioner,
56 F.2d 917 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 606 (1932), the controlling stockholder,
having transferred land to his corporation, contracted to buy clay removed from the
land in return for the corporation's promise to pay his wife and children a specified
sum for the land and a percentage of the gross income from the clay. The court held
that the taxpayer controlled both sides of the transaction, which was merely an antici-
patory assignment of income. See also 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxA
ToN § 18.01 n.2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
Assignments of income held to be ineffective for tax purposes have taken
diverse forms, including the following: a stock option granted the wife of an
employee as part of the consideration for the services rendered by her hus-
band; . . . a majority stockholder waiving his right to dividends so that in-
creased dividends may be paid to minority stockholders who are primarily his
relatives; payment of excessive salaries to the wife and children of the princi-
pal officer and stockholder of a corporation; donating services with the earn-
ings to be used for charitable purposes; transferring property with the return
consideration to be paid to a charitable foundation.
Id. § 18.02, at 7-8.
10. The courts have been slow to adopt a general guiding principle for dealing withhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/5
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however, have been reluctant to permit such assignments."1 As a
general rule, a taxpayer may not escape tax liability on income re-
ceived as a result of property ownership merely by assigning the right
to receive the income;' 2 rather, he must transfer the income-pro-
ducing property itself.13  Moreover, the transfer is ineffective for
tax purposes if the taxpayer either retains direct or collateral control
of the transferred property or fails to relinquish his entire interest. 14
income assignments. See 2 MERTms § 18.01 n.4 for the suggestion that court preoccu-
pation with averting tax avoidance has inhibited lucid consideration of the merits of
assignments. The courts have tended to oversimplify and to use verbal formulae to
forestall a suspected avoidance device.
11. In Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), the Supreme Court held a contract in
which the taxpayer's wife was to receive half of the taxpayer's income to be ineffective
for tax purposes because earned income is taxable to the individual who earns it.
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements
and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. . . . [N]o distinction
can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which
the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
Id. at 114-15.
12. The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those
who earn or otherwise create the right to receive the income and enjoy the benefit of
it when paid. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).
13. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), in which a gift of the beneficial
interest in a testamentary trust was deemed to be a gift of property, income from which
was held taxable to the donees. In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), it was
held that the owner of bonds is taxed on interest earned by the bonds even though
he has assigned the coupons to another. The most comprehensive works in this area
are Lyon & Eustice, supra note 6; Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assign-
ment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAx L. Rnv. 1 (1964). iSee also 2 MERTENS
§ 18.02, at 4.
14. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Corliss v. Bowers, 281
U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
The law of grantor trusts is analogous. Following Helvering v. Clifford, supra, Con-
gress attempted to bring order to this area by enacting INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§
671-75, 678. See Revenue Act of 1924 § 219(g)-(h), ch. 234, §§ 219(g)-(h), 43
Stat. 253. Sections 674(a) and 677 provide, for example, that the grantor of a
trust is taxable on its income if he or a nonadverse party retains certain powers to
dispose or control beneficial enjoyment of the income or corpus. If the grantor trans-
fers his entire interest in the corpus and income, and neither he nor a nonadverse party
retains power to control beneficial enjoyment, later taxable income will not be attri-
buted to him. The bulk of these sections is concerned with delimiting the powers of
administration and control of beneficial enjoyment which the grantor may retain with-
out being liable to taxation. Thus, the remainder of § 674 provides that trust income
is not attributable to the grantor even though he retains certain indirect or weak powers
to alter beneficial enjoyment. Nevertheless, as the scope of retained power and control
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As applied to stock transfers, it is clear that when a taxpayer makes
a bona fide assignment of stock in a going corporation, subsequent
income derived from dividends or redemption is not taxable to the
assignor.15 Assignment of an existing right to receive liquidating
dividends prior to receipt by the assignor, however, is a taxable antici-
patory assignment of income.' 6
To determine whether an assignment is one of stock or of a right
to receive liquidating dividends, courts have implied that a condition
precedent to finding a taxable anticipatory assignment is that the as-
signor own an absolute and indefeasible future entitlement to income.
Courts have used a variety of rationales to determine whether the
condition is met. 7  In Winton v. Kelm 8 a distriot court reasoned
that realization of income' 9 occurs upon dissolution of the corpor-
ation; since the substantial element in dissolution is the stockholder's
increases, the risk of attribution also increases until a certain point is reached at which
the grantor will be considered owner of the trust corpus for tax purposes.
15. If there is no liquidation plan in effect or anticipated, and if there is no de-
clared but unpaid dividend attached to the shares, a bona fide gift of stock is merely
a gift of appreciated property and ownership rights in the corporation. If the donee
subsequently sells the stock or receives dividends, the income is taxable to him rather
than to the donor. 'See, e.g., Armais Arutunoff, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 931 (1963);
H.B. Garden, 16 B.T.A. 592 (1929). See also INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 102.
16. Since liquidating dividends include earnings and earnings are taxed to the earn-
ing party, this is a simple case of anticipatory assignment of income. See Helvering
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
17. For cases that have held a transfer of stock not an anticipatory assignment,
see Simmons v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Ga. 1972) (taxpayer owned only
0.3% in broadly held corporation of which three-fourths was transferred to irrevo-
cable trust subsequent to stockholder approval of plan of liquidation); Charleston
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.W. Va. 1971) (taxpayer held 37%
and transferred 2% interest subsequent to stockholder approval of plan and initia-
tion of sale of assets); Jacobs v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohio), ajj'd
per curiam, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer held 53.5% of stock in
closely held corporation, the remainder being held by his relatives and employees);
Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1954) (taxpayers owned 35% of
stock in closely held corporation and taxpayer transferred an 18% interest to char-
itable trust after liquidation plan had been recommended by directors; three days
later a trustee voted for the plan as did other stockholders; two of the three stock-
holder-taxpayers were also two of the three trustees); cf. Rushing v. Commissioner,
441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
18. 122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1954).
19. Since not all economic gain is taxable income, "realization of income" has de-
veloped as a term of art describing the occurrence of an event rendering income tax-
able. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940); Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920). See also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); note 30 infra,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/5
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vote to liquidate,20 it is the casting of that vote that fulfills the condi-
tion. Thus, a transfer prior to the vote is one of stock, while a
subsequent transfer is a taxable anticipatory assignment of liquidat-
ing dividends. Another court reasoned that the event fulfilling the
condition occurs when the assignor is designated distributee of rec-
ord.2 The rationale most consistently followed is the "technically
possible abandonment" test22 enunciated in Jacobs v. United States.23
Pursuant to this test, the condition precedent is unfulfilled and a trans-
fer is not an anticipatory assignment of income if there is even a re-
mote possibility that the liquidation plan might be abandoned. 4
In Kinsey v. Commissioner25 the Second Circuit chose not to use
the Jacobs test. The court instead followed the Eighth Circuit's ra-
tionale in Hudspeth v. United States" and reasoned in terms of con-
trol, intent, and realization of gain. First, if the assignment is to be
effective for tax purposes, the assignor must relinquish all control,
20. 122 F. Supp. at 653.
21. Simmons v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 947, 952 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
22. See, e.g., Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1971); Sim-
mons v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 947, 952 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Charleston Nat'1 Bank
v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
23. 280 F. Supp. 437, 439 (S.D. Ohio), affd per curiam, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir.
1968): "In spite of the arguments concerning the unlikelihood of a repudiation of the
dissolution proceedings prior to their finality, the fact remains that such abandonment
was entirely possible." The abandonment was possible despite the fact that taxpayer and
his relatives retained complete control of the corporation subsequent to the transfer. Id.
at 438.
24. See cases cited note 22 supra.
25. 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972). Taxpayer owned 81.5% of a Missouri corpo-
ration and his sons owned the balance. Nine months after the stockholders had
adopted a plan of liquidation, and three weeks before the first distributions were made,
taxpayer transferred a 6.7% interest to charities. The district court, following Jacobs,
determined the crucial issue to be whether the liquidation plan was reversible or irreversi-
ble under Missouri law. Construing Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.471 (1969) to permit vitia-
tion of the plan, the court held for the taxpayer. Hudspeth v. United States, 335 F.
Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1971). On appeal the Eighth Circuit construed Missouri law to
hold the liquidation plan irreversible upon adoption. The district court's misconstruction
was sufficient to require reversal, but the court of appeals held further that the Jacobs
test was not the proper criterion, stating: "[R]ealities and substance of the events must
govern our determination, rather than formalities and remote hypothetical possibilities."
471 F.2d at 277. If the efficacy of the Hudspeth analysis was weakened by the court's
alternative ground, it is strengthened by the Second Circuit in Kinsey. Indeed, the Kin-
sey opinion incorporates much of the Hudspeth language, as Hudspeth incorporated lan-
guage of the Kinsey Tax Court. See 471 F.2d at 280, quoting John P. Kinsey, 58 T.C.
259, 266 (1972).
313
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both direct and collateral, over receipt of its income.2 7 The crucial
element is not control of the stock assigned, but rather control of the
corporation after the assignment.28 Second, the court must deter-
mine whether the taxpayer intended to transfer stock in a viable cor-
poration, or whether he intended merely that his assignee participate
in the proceeds of liquidation. Winton suggested that the stockhold-
er's vote is a crucial point because it provides evidence of the tax-
payer's intentions for the corporation's future.29 Subsequent pro-
ceedings, such as sales of assets and closing out business functions,
aid the court in determining the taxpayer's intent.80 Finally, the
court must determine whether the assignor realized gain. In some
cases courts have considered dissolution the event operative to sever
gain.31  Nevertheless, merely by exercising his power to control
the liquidation, the assignor may ensure -that liquidation proceeds are
received by the assignee and thereby realize satisfaction to the same
extent as if he had first received the proceeds and then donated
them.
32
In most respects the facts in Kinsey and Hudspeth are similar; the
primary difference is that Kinsey transferred a controlling interest.
27. 477 F.2d at 1062-63. See Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (D.
Minn. 1954).
28. The question is whether the taxpayer has engineered the sequence of events so
that the assignee will be unable to exercise stock ownership rights in a viable corpo-
ration. See Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 279 (8th Cir. 1972).
29. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
30. 471 F.2d at 279.
31. See, e.g., Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1954).
32. Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275, 280 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Hel-
vering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940), in which the Court, in recognizing that
realization may be a function of nonmaterial benefit to the assignor, stated:
[lIncome is "realized" by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the
source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could
have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the
means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally
enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of
his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfac-
tions, or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as a means of procuring
them.
Applied to the facts in Hudspeth, these concepts clearly dictated the result reached by
the Eighth Circuit. Taxpayer retained a direct controlling interest in the corporation
after the assignment; contracts for sale of corporate assets were entered into before the
transfer; the stockholders' adoption of the plan of liquidation occurred nine months be-
fore the transfer. In effect and in reality, "the shares transferred were merely empty
vessels by which the taxpayer conveyed the liquidation proceeds." Hudspeth v. United
States, 471 F.2d 275, 279 (8th Cir. 1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/5
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The Second Circuit decided that the difference in proportion of stock
transferred was, under Connecticut law, a difference without a distinc-
tion. Although DePauw was given a majority of stock, it did not
have the two-thirds majority required to stop the liquidation, even
had it so desired. Following the rationale suggested in Hudspeth,
the court implied that Kinsey had engineered the sequence of events
so that in reality his assignee had neither the ability nor the desire to
exercise stock ownership rights in a viable corporation.3 3  The re-
maining facts merely reinforce this conclusion: stockholder adoption
of the liquidation plan and partial distribution of corporate assets prior
to the transfer evidence Kinsey's intention; and his advice to DePauw's
representative not to sell the stock34 further indicates Kinsey's inten-
tion that his assignment be nothing more than a right to share in li-
quidation proceeds. It seems equally clear that Kinsey expected to
receive satisfaction from giving to his alma mater, the kind of non-
material satisfaction which the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Horst3"
characterized as realization. 6
It remains to be seen how other circuits will view this increasingly
common class of cases. These cases will continue to arise because
transfers with tax consequences based on the Jacobs rationale are
quite favorable to the taxpayer.37  Given his past position, however,
it seems certain that the Commissioner will not acquiesce in the appli-
cation of an analysis less rigorous than that adopted in Hudspeth and
Kinsey.
33. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
34. See note 3 supra.
35. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. One suspects that market value per share of a closely held corporation is gen-
erally less than the value of its subsequent liquidating dividend. Assignment after the
liquidation plan has been adopted permits the stockholder to vote his shares and set
liquidation wheels turning before relinquishing any control. The assignor thus elimi-
nates gross income otherwise attributable to the liquidating dividends and concurrently
takes a charitable deduction based on the value of the donation.
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